Beating Up of Quarters
By Robert Giglio
based on an article by Keith Roberts first appearing in
ECW Notes & Queries (Caliver Books/Partizan Press)
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I thought it befitting to include this information on a common ECW tactic, to show where I devised the plan of the Society's reaction to the `Drum Incident' at the 1993 Grand Muster, and which many of the soldiers had asked about. The use of this proper period tactic allowed our members to react in a period way and therefore take our opponents by surprise!
One of the most common offensive activities of cavalrymen during the Civil War was a surprise attack on the garrisons and encampments of their opponents, a practice known as "beating up quarters." An illustration of this is the comment by Richard Atkyns, a captain in Prince Maurice's Regiment of Horse, that "...there did hardly a week pass in the summer half year, in which there was not battle of skirmish fought, or beating up of quarters." Most officers or others truly interested in the period should already be familiar with this style of attack, but for those that do not study the period closely (especially those bozos that think they are officers!), the obvious question is how exactly was this done? The answer, as with most questions on military practice at this time, can be found by reference to the contemporary military manuals. Many soldiers, whether commanding or serving in troops of horse during the Civil War, had little practical experience, and the manuals were intended to supply the theory and the practical examples they needed. John Cruso's Militarie Instructions for the Cavall'rie (1632) was the most widely used manual for cavalry before and during the Civil War, although it describes a European theory somewhat outmoded by 1642. A more interesting example for actions during the Civil War is John Vernon's The Young Horseman, or the Honest Plain-Dealing Cavalier (1644). Vernon drew upon his knowledge of contemporary manuals such as Cruso's, and his own considerable experience as a cavalry officer in the Parliamentary Army when he wrote his pamphlet, and the result is both readable and informative. On the subject of the "beating up of Quarters", Vernon writes as follows: "The best and most advantageable way for the surprising of a Quarter, is to be secretly and suddenly assailed, which may be performed after this manner, or the like. The Regiment of Horse consisting for the most part of seven Troops, who are to be divided severally, the first Troop marching secretly without any forerunner, coming near the enemies Quarters, and perceiving themselves to be discovered by the enemies Sentinels shall suddenly without losing any time charge the Sentinels, and enter the Quarters with them immediately surprising the Corps de Gard, the second Troop immediately following shall possess themselves of the Alarm place, the third Troop shall straight ways possess themselves of the Market place, the fourth Troop shall with speed run through each street, keeping the soldiers in and thereby hinder them from mounting on horseback, or uniting of themselves together, the fifth Troop being entered, and hearing where the greatest noise is, shall immediately repair thither and alight, entering the houses, either put to the sword or take prisoners all whom they shall find to be enemies. The rest of the body may place themselves in the most convenient places on either side of Town, for the better surprising of those soldiers that shall endeavor to escape through the gardens or other back ways, by reason of the horses running through the streets within the Town, hindering them either to mount on horseback, or unite themselves together. Now although your enemy consists of twice so much strength as yourselves, which sometimes will cause them to be the more secure and negligent in their watches, yet will they not be able by reason of this secret and sudden surprise to stand against you."The object of the attacker was to cut down the sentries (who would be placed outside the quarters) before an alarm could be given, and then overrun the Corps de Guard (the rest of the soldiers or troopers who would be ready and armed to support the outer sentinels, but were in a relaxed state). By taking possession of the `alarm point' (the area designated for all soldiers or troopers in their quarters to muster in case of an alarm), and the `market place' (the other likely large open space where men could quickly gather and become organized into a fighting force), the attackers prevented their opponents from gathering together for a proper defense. By riding down the various streets of the town, the attackers kept their opponents in small pockets to be killed or captured by the fifth troop. Lastly, once the surprised defenders gave up hope of defense, they would seek to escape as best they could, and the reserve troops of the attackers would wait outside the town to mop them up. The objective of the defender, once he realized his force was surprised, was to delay the attackers at all costs, and by doing this it would allow his men to get armed and mounted to counter-attack. A good example of this tactic in practice can be seen in the Royalist attack on Parliament's quarters at Olney, North Buckinghamshire, in November 1643. Quartered in the town were two regiments of horse from the City of London (Col. Edmund Harvey's and Col. Richard Turner's), and a regiment of foot (Col. Randall Mainwaring's redcoats). The town itself lay on one side of the river Ouse, with a bridge leading to the nearest supporting Parliamentary forces, who were some distance away on the other side of the river at Newport. The objective of the Royalist attackers was to surprise the quarters, take possession of the bridge, and therefore trap the Parliamentarians and kill or capture all of them. To do this the Royalists mustered a force that their opponents later recorded as eight regiments of horse (perhaps 2000 cavalrymen), 400 dragoons and 200 `commanded musketeers' (infantrymen temporarily seconded from their foot regiments for this special duty and mounted behind the cavalry troopers). The Royalists attacked at 7a.m., and the Parliamentarian commander, Col. Harvey, was unaware of their arrival until "...a quarter of an hour before the body appeared within musket shot of the town." Initially believing there were no more than 500 Royalists, and determined to give his men time to mount up, Col. Harvey personally led those troops which he could immediately muster together in a hasty effort to delay the enemy. He discovered too late that the exact number of Royalists, and before he could draw his men up in proper formation, the Royalists charged and swept his troopers back into the town. The Parliamentarian infantry were caught up in the rout, and as one of their officers later wrote, "...our poor red coats were put to their shifts, being broken all in pieces by our own horse, that they had no means to be gotten together again." Col. Harvey's troopers were forced back through the town and over the bridge, knocking some of their own infantry into the river while crossing, but eventually managed to rally on the other side of the river and counter-attacked. Col. Harvey's objective at this point was to regain control of the town, since a large part of his command was still isolated within its houses, and would eventually become prisoners unless the town was quickly retaken. This he succeeded in doing by a series of countercharges supported by musketeers. In conclusion, in this instance, the Royalists had initially made a successful and well-planned surprise attack, which had almost succeeded in destroying Col. Harvey's force. In any case, the Royalists shook up the Parliamentarian soldiers pretty badly, as 26 bodies from both sides were found dead in the town. Col. Harvey's troopers, who cautiously followed the Royalists as they retired, reported that about 20 of them had their wounds treated at a manor house two miles away. The most seriously injured of these could not be carried further, and were left behind to fall prisoner to the Parliamentarians. This is an interesting account in itself, but its real value is in illustrating in practice the military theories of the day, which both sides aspired to. Once we have grasped these military theories, we can follow this small but typical action, understanding what each commander was trying to do, and appreciate the options he considered open to him. With regard to miniatures wargamers (which nearly all of the Society is composed of), this small action would transfer quite nicely to the tabletop for a skirmish or small unit scenario! Although this is a small action, it is a well documented one, as three Parliamentarian soldiers produced descriptions which were published in London, but the same principles also holds true for other actions in the Civil Wars. There is no lack of contemporary records for this period, provided that people take the time to try and research it, but without some background knowledge, a significant part of any military account is meaningless. The military manuals of the seventeenth century, whether for drill or for wider military theory, are frequently overlooked today. Although, these manuals formed an essential part of the life of the soldier, both for training and fighting, and help us understand the experience of the soldier in the ranks, and of the officer commanding him, which the manuals were made for and purchased by. The soldier was trained from these manuals, and the officers hoped to use it to train their men in the formations they would use when battle began. Works on military theory have a wider relevance as they provide some explanation of contemporary strategy, which unfortunately, all too many officers lack even the most basic understanding of. Sources The Happy Successe of the Parliament's Armie at Newport and some other places (London, Nov. 1643). A Letter from Colonell Harvie, to his Excellency Robert Earle of Essex (London, Nov. 1643). A True Relation of all the skirmishes between our Forces and the Cavaliers at Owlny sent in a letter from Captaine George Paine (London, Nov. 1643). The Young Horseman, or the Honest plain-Dealing Cavalier, John Vernon (London, 1644). The Vindication of Richard Atkyns, Richard Atkyns (London, 1669). |
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